From the Clouds to the Trenches

Learning to Manage the Marketplace

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From the Clouds to the Trenches

Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Counterfactuals

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Overview









Very Brief Intro to Search Advertising Marketplace Objective

Marketplace Optimization

Understanding the Marketplace









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Search Advertising



Product Ads

- Advertisers are charged per click
 - Ad platforms typically provide features to optimize for other targets
 - Ads can have "decorations", making slot sizes variable
 - Decorations can be advertiser provided or generated by the platform
 - Different ad products coexist on the same page
 - E.g. Text Ads and Product Ads can compete for the same slots

Beyond Web Search

Shopping Vertical Hotel Widsally Similar Products Ь dresses Related products Related images AI Shoooing Your recent searches: baby dresses @ Plus Sze Dres Black ses for Wome R **Gear all filters** Found these results for "dress BRAND Forever 21 Chaps Boston Proper BLACK FAUX SUEDE P. Sexy and Fashion Wom.. Sexy Black High Heels . Megan (Black) Knee High Ca. Giuseppe Zanotti New B. Venus From \$35.16 From \$20.00 From \$26.99 From \$1475.00 From \$11.50 From \$29.99 Vicki Wayne 1 store 1 store 1 store 1 store 2 stores 1 store 10 more PRICE Up to \$30 \$74.00 ***** (3) \$30-\$50 JCPenney Liz Claiborne 3/4 Grommet Bell Sieeve Shift Dress -\$50-\$80 \$80 - \$800 Over \$800 Smin to Smax COLOR • Shiekh Women's Sam-19.. Shiekh Women's Helen-1. Caged Backless Finders Keepers hot sale woman ladies lea. Black Women's Helen-1 L. From \$9.99 From \$39.99 From \$20.90 From \$23.50 From \$39.99 From \$15.00 1 store 1 store 1 store 1 store 2 stores 1 store • OCCA BON \$32.99 Venus Cocktail Party Venus Women's Lace Detail Long Dress Dresses - White Work Wedding 6 S 22% price drop Formal Casual Costumes NECKLINE CAMPBELL PARK Scoop Save up to \$131 e V Neck Aspen Suites Hotel Pay less for 17 3-star plus Sweetheart TripAdvisor (109) hotels in 4 miles \$179 One-Shoulder -star hotel · Anchorage \$42.00 3+ sites Square "Rooms were spacious, clean and TAKU/CAMPBELL the kitchenette was great." •5 more Gap Women's Softspun Balloon Sleeve Dress True Black V2 3 Petite Size XS SAND LAKE Amenities









Marketplace Objective

Marketplace Optimization



Understanding the Marketplace

NEED TO PICK Blue Sky

• Ultimate objective is to maximize Long-Term Revenue

Revenue = #Users * Queries per User * Ads per Query * Clicks per Ad * Cost Per Click Function of the user and the system
Function of the advertiser and the system

- Can we compute the long-term Revenue [think years]?
 - Need to estimate how our decisions would impact user activity and advertiser spend, over a long horizon.
 - E.g. how would showing more ads affect the user's search activity?
 - Not trivial to model the dependencies accurately
 - Reinforcement Learning provides a framework for a path forward

Down to Earth

- Assumption 1: satisfied users will engage more with the product
 - Short-term user satisfaction can be a proxy for long-term user activity
- Assumption 2: satisfied advertisers will increase spend
 - Short-term advertiser satisfaction can be a proxy for long-term advertiser spend
- Maximize all three short term metrics: Revenue, User Satisfaction and Advertiser Satisfaction
- Frequently formulated as:

max <i>imize</i>	(Short Term) Revenue	
s.t.	(Short Term) User Satisfaction	$\geq K_u$
	(Short Term) Advertiser Satisfaction	$\geq K_a$

Trenches

- How do we measure user satisfaction?
 - User agnostic relevance metrics
 - or implicit user feedback (e.g. click through rate, short dwelltime click rate)
 - or a combination?

How (not) to Pick your Metrics



Adding whitespace does not change the relevance of ads

Pushing down all the other content typically improves click-through rates

Is the page with only ads visible *better* for the user?

Trenches

- How do we measure user satisfaction?
 - User agnostic relevance metrics
 - or implicit user feedback (e.g. click through rate, short dwelltime click rate, *space taken*)
 - or a combination?
- How do we measure advertiser satisfaction?
 - Long Dwelltime Click Through Rate, Conversion Rate, Quality of Match?

One Size Does Not Always Fit All

- User query: "a z office supplies"
- Click and Dwelltime metrics are reasonable
 - No advertiser concern on performance as they measure it
- However Advertiser complains about the brand mismatch
 - Not a concern shared by other advertisers given the ads are performing

Trenches

- How do we measure user satisfaction?
 - User agnostic relevance metrics
 - or implicit user feedback (e.g. click through rate, short dwelltime click rate, *space taken*)
 - or a combination?
- How do we measure advertiser satisfaction?
 - Long Dwelltime Click Through Rate, Conversion Rate, Quality of Match?
- Single metric rarely captures all information
 - No need to artificially limit ourselves to using one metric alone

Trenches

- How do we evaluate our choice of metrics?
 - Run long-term experiments to measure the relation between the proposed proxies and longterm metrics?
 - Challenges:
 - Treatment dilution due to limitations in identifying users
 - Geo-based experiments can be tricky to analyze even with synthetic controls
 - Unexpected events can impact only one region
 - Advertisers target locations, may be tricky to separate advertiser and user response
 - Use user/advertiser complaints to verify your metric choices?









Marketplace Objective

Marketplace Optimization A Counterfactual Story



Understanding the Marketplace

• Rank and allocate ads to optimize the objective:

max <i>imize</i>	(Short Term) Revenue	
s.t.	(Short Term) User Satisfaction	$\geq K_u$
	(Short Term) Advertiser Satisfaction	$\geq K_a$

• Can be solved via the Lagrangian Relaxation:

maximize Revenue + $\lambda_u User Satisfaction + \lambda_a Advertiser Satisfaction$

 Price is determined only after allocation. Replace Revenue (p(click) * price) with Welfare (p(click) * bid)

objective function = Welfare + λ_u User Satisfaction + λ_a Advertiser Satisfaction

A Per Slot Greedy Allocation Algorithm

objective function (rankscore, rs) = Welfare + λ_u User Satisfaction + λ_a Advertiser Satisfaction

Generalized Second Price



Need probability of click, user satisfaction and advertiser satisfaction for that slot. E.g. p(click|slot = i)

 $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Pricing} \\ \mbox{smallest bid } b' \ \mbox{ such that } rs_1(b' \) \geq rs_2 \end{array}$

A Per Slot Greedy Allocation Algorithm

objective function (rankscore, rs) = Welfare + λ_u User Satisfaction + λ_a Advertiser Satisfaction



A Per Slot Greedy Allocation Algorithm

objective function (rankscore, rs) = Welfare + λ_u User Satisfaction + λ_a Advertiser Satisfaction



Back to the Objective Function

• Need to compute the $\lambda's$

 $Welfare + \lambda_u User Satisfaction + \lambda_a Advertiser Satisfaction$

- λ_u and λ_a can be interpreted as shadow prices:
 - λ_u is the cost of degrading user satisfaction by one unit
 - λ_a is the cost of degrading advertiser satisfaction by one unit
- Estimate using long-term experiments
 - Requires high accuracy. Small differences in the estimate may result in large differences in the outcome.
- Tune $\lambda's$ to meet business constraints and maximize the objective

How to Tune λ 's

• If we could estimate the outcome of setting $\lambda's$ to any value, we could find the values that maximize the objective

				Long Dwelltime	Conversion
	λ_u	λ_a	Revenue	Click Yield	Rate
	1	1	120	0.080	0.010
	1	10	118	0.080	0.020
	1	20	116	0.090	0.030
_					
	100	50	110	0.120	0.025
	100	100	105	0.130	0.027

Maximum Revenue s.t. Long Dwelltime Click Yield > 0.11 Conversion Rate > 0.022

How to Tune $\lambda's$

- If we could estimate the outcome of setting λ's to any value, we could find the values that maximize the objective.
- How to estimate the outcome of different $\lambda' s$?

Output of λ_u , λ_a values that were used to serve the request online



https://www.macys.com/shop/womens-clothing/dresses/Color_normal/Red?id=5449 +

FREE SHIPPING AVAILABLE!

Shop our Collection of Women's Red Dresses at Macvs.com for the Latest Designer Brands & Styles.

Output of new λ_u , λ_a values that were not observed online



How would the user respond?

Red Dresses at JCPenney® | Extra 25% Off + Free Shipping https://www.jopenney.com/reddresses *

 Ad
 Save on Red Dresses at JCPenney. Discover Great Savings Today at JCPenney®.

 jepenney.com has been visited by 1M+ users in the past month

 Free Shipping to Stores - Earn Rewards Points - Bedding - Up to 50% Off - Up to 40% Off Watches

Red Dress Boutique | Discover a New Favorite Dress

 Add
 New Stock Arrives Every Day. Snag these Hot Looks While You Can. Order Here!

 reddressboutique.com has been visited by 10K+ users in the past month

 Always On Trend · Epic Restock · Free Shipping over \$50 · As Seen on Shark Tank

How to Tune $\lambda^\prime s$

- If we could estimate the outcome of setting $\lambda' s$ to any value, we could find the values that maximize the objective.
- How to estimate the outcome of different $\lambda' s$?
 - Simulate the output of the system
 - Requires the ability to replay the end-to-end stack offline
 - Comprehensive logging is critical for high fidelity simulations
 - Simulate the user response
 - Requires estimating counterfactual probabilities
 - User model needs to be accurate for rarely seen ad slates as well





Counterfactual Click Modeling

- Goal: Estimate the *p(click)* for counterfactual allocations
- Model Inputs:
 - Query logs with click/no-click information
 - Post-allocation information
 - Ad position, ad size, other ads, page layout
 - Not available for the online models
- Model Output:

p(click|query, user, ad, do(allocation))

- Need to handle biases that exist in observational data
 - E.g. Utilize Exploration and Propensity Scoring



Alternative to Simulation

- Disadvantages of simulation:
 - Requires replaying the end-to-end stack, can take time
 - Simulating the user response accurately may be challenging
- Idea: Explore different values of $\lambda's$ at run time
 - For some portion of real traffic, sample λ values from a distribution
 - Use importance sampling to compute estimated metrics

$$E_p[f(x)] = \int f(x) \frac{p(x)}{q(x)} q(x) dx = E_q \left[f(x) \frac{p(x)}{q(x)} \right]$$

- Disadvantages:
 - Randomization has short-term cost (can be reduced by joint sampling)
 - Confidence intervals widen as we increase the variance in exploration.











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Explaining KPI Movements





What caused the KPI to diverge from the forecast?

- Did supply (user/query) change?
 - Unexpected news events can cause major changes in query distributions.
- Did demand (advertisers) change?
 - Advertisers unseasonably increasing or decreasing their budget can result in unexpected KPI movements.
- Did the system change?
 - Did we introduce a bug?
- Some factors like economy might cause both the supply and the demand to change.

Supply As A Case Study

- Can we quantify how supply changes impact KPIs?
 - E.g. what's the contribution of supply differences in the analysis period vs the reference period on KPIs?
- Idea: Build a synthetic control for the reference period using only supply features



Measuring Advertiser Response

- Typical questions about advertiser reponse:
 - If we were to improve {Conversion Rate, ROI} would the advertisers increase spend?
 - Would the increase (if any) be sufficient to overcome the first order revenue drop?
- Challenges:
 - Number of active advertisers is small, and spend per advertiser is very skewed
 - Not all advertisers have the same objective
 - Advertisers may not respond, or even if they do response times might be variable and long (quarters instead of within session)

Advertiser Experiments

- Approach:
 - Experiment on advertisers who are likely to respond
 - Assume a simple a-priori model for advertiser response (e.g. the more the prices change the likelier the advertisers respond)
 - Estimate first order effect of the treatment per advertiser using simulations
 - Pick the set of advertisers with maximum predictive power
 - Randomly assign the selected advertisers to treatment and control
 - Pairwise stratified randomization works better than IID
 - Find the optimal policy (i.e. which advertisers should get the treatment)
 - Build a better model of advertiser response (using the experiment data)
 - Use the new model to pick the advertisers that would react positively to the experiment

Optimal Policy Identification

• Inputs:

- $\{x_j\}_{j \in J}$: Advertiser features, measured pre-experiment
- $\{t_j\}_{j \in J}$: Treatment indicators
- $\{y_i^{(t_j)}\}_{j \in J}$: Per sample reward, e.g. post-treatment spend per advertiser
- Task:
 - Find policy $\pi: X \to \{0,1\}$ which maximizes $R(\pi) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j \in J} y_j^{(\pi(x_j))}$
 - I.e. characterise advertisers for which $y_i^{(1)} > y_i^{(0)}$
- Model: Honest Random Forests
 - Use control and treatment advertisers to build a forest per advertiser using leave-advertiser-out
 - Effect on sample *j* estimated as the difference between treatment and control samples in the same node (after excluding *j*)

Full Population













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Looking Ahead

- Reinforcement Learning to directly optimize for the Long-Term
 - Already interesting work happening but under many assumptions
- Advertising Ecosystem is evolving
 - Advertisers are moving to AI/ML for everything: UX design, content generation, budget management and more
 - Modeling causal dependencies will be critical to react optimally
- User Interface is evolving
 - Definition of clicks or engagement needs to adapt